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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates a calendar effect, namely the weekend overreaction, in spot 
foreign exchange markets of 8 major and 9 emerging currencies. We find that after a 
large price difference between Friday close and subsequent Monday open, most 
markets are likely to reverse in multiple horizons during the following week, which is 
consistent with the overreaction hypothesis. We develop a reversal trading strategy to 
exploit this effect which we show are robust to transaction costs and interest rates. In 
the out-of-sample test, the strategy is able to generate abnormal risk-adjusted returns, 
which suggests that these currency markets might be weak-form inefficient. 
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1. Introduction 
Our paper identifies a calendar effect which we observe in the world’s largest market, 
the foreign exchange market. We call this effect ‘weekend overreaction’. Specifically, 
we observe exchange rate behaviours after a large weekend gap (i.e. a large price 
difference between Friday close and subsequent Monday open) and find significant 
overreaction in the majority of our sample. After a large weekend gap, most currency 
markets are likely to reverse in multiple horizons during the following week, which is 
consistent with the overreaction hypothesis. Out of the 16 currency pairs we examine, 
only one shows no significant reversal. We develop a reversal trading strategy based 
on this effect which we show is able to generate abnormal risk-adjusted returns (net of 
costs) up to more than 10% per annum. This result suggests that these currency 
markets might be weak-form inefficient and our study may be of interest to both 
academics and practitioners. For academics, we document the weekend overreaction 
and provide evidence against market efficiency while for practitioners, we propose a 
profitable trading strategy. Our work is motivated by the literature on stock price 
predictability after large price changes (e.g.(Amini et al. 2013) and the vast literature 
on calendar effects (e.g.(Urquhart and McGroarty 2014) as well as the literature on 
overreaction.  
 
The seminal paper on overreaction by Debondt and Thaler (1985) studied NYSE 
stocks from 1926 to 1982 and they hypothesise that if markets overshoot 
systematically, reversals are predictable from past data. Additional research by 
Debondt and Thaler (1987) shows that the winner-loser effect (i.e. overreaction) is not 
because of risk change or firm size, which is supported by Alonso and Rubio (1990), 
who confirm that the overreaction hypothesis is not rejected after considering firm 
size which only explains a part of profitability. Conversely, Zarowin (1990) replicates 
Debondt and Thaler (1985) and maintains that overreaction is due to the size effect, 
yet conceding that although size effect can explain long-term reversals (i.e. several 
years), short-term overreaction remains unexplained.  
 
In another paper, Fung et al. (2000) report reversals after large overnight price 
changes in S&P500 and Hang Seng Index stock futures between 1993 and 1996. The 
reversal magnitude is commensurate with the size of overnight price gaps and 
overreaction is a common effect. However, Atkins and Dyl (1990) warn that spreads 
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may explain short-term reversals and lead to biased returns without careful 
consideration. Cox and Peterson (1994) study US stocks from 1963 to 1991 and find 
that in addition to spreads (i.e. bid-ask bounce), liquidity is important in reversals. 
Moreover, after a large daily price decline, they observe a momentum effect within 4 
– 20 days instead of a reversal.  
 
Potential reasons for overreaction include investors’ misperception of future cash 
flows (Debondt and Thaler 1987), firm-specific information or liquidity-motivated 
trades (Jegadeesh and Titman 1995), analysts’ extrapolation of past growth of 
earnings per share (Bauman et al. 1999), among others. In behavioural finance, 
attempts to explain reversals include the DHS model (Daniel et al. 2001) and BSV 
model (Barberis et al. 1998). The DHS model proposes that overreaction is caused by 
overconfident investors who believe that their information is more accurate than it 
actually is and the part of their signals reflecting true future price changes is more 
substantial than it objectively is. Meanwhile, the BSV model postulates that investors 
believe that earnings switch between mean-reversion and continuation regimes, and 
overreaction will occur if they believe that the current state is continuation. Although 
researchers disagree about causes of contrarian profitability, it is statistically and 
economically significant and not entirely attributable to risk or market frictions 
(Antoniou et al. 2005). 
 
Regarding the overreaction literature in FX markets, using daily data, Larson and 
Madura (2001) confirm overreaction in five emerging currencies from 1988 to 1995 
while Parikakis and Syriopoulos (2008) examine EUR pairs from 1999 to 2007 and 
conclude that USD tends to overreact and that contrarian strategies are profitable in 
FX. Additionally, Goodhart (1988) shows that the GBP/USD pair in the 1980s 
overshoots using hourly data while Rentzler et al. (2006) report intraday reversals in 
five currency futures on Chicago Mercantile Exchange from 1988 to 2003 after large 
one-day returns and opening gaps. In another paper, Ederington and Lee (1995) use 
tick data from 1988 to 1992 and discover that Deutschemark futures overreact to 
scheduled macroeconomic news releases in the first 40 seconds after the 
announcement and reverse in the next few minutes. 
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This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. Firstly, this is the first paper to 
identify the effect of weekend overreaction in spot FX rates. We are motivated by 
French and Roll (1986) and Ito et al. (1998), who find that asset prices behave 
differently during exchange trading hours compared to non-trading hours. 
Specifically, French and Roll (1986) examine US stocks from 1963 to 1982 and find 
that returns are much more volatile during the trading week than during the weekends. 
Meanwhile, Ito et al. (1998) analyse the Tokyo FX market from September 1994 to 
March 1995 and find that the variance of lunch-returns doubles since trading during 
the lunch break is allowed in December 1994. In our case, because the global FX 
markets are active around the clock during the weekdays, the natural choice of non-
trading periods is the weekends. Our second contribution is that based on this 
weekend overreaction, we provide evidence against weak-form efficiency using a 
long dataset of various developed and emerging currencies.  
 
The effect that we find is related to that of Menkhoff et al. (2012) 1 because we both 
observe future returns conditional on past returns. However, our effect is different in 
two ways. The first difference is the timescale of observation. While Menkhoff et al. 
(2012) observe monthly returns of the subsequent 12 months conditional on the 
previous 12 months, we observe returns of the subsequent week conditional on the 
previous weekends. The second difference is the observed directional behaviours of 
future returns. While Menkhoff et al. (2012) find a momentum effect; we find a 
reversal effect. 
 
This paper proceeds as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present the data and methodology of 
tests for overreaction and our reversal trading strategy. Section 4 reports test results 
and strategy performance. Section 5 discusses the findings and concludes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 We thank an anonymous reviewer for mentioning this point. 
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2. Data  
We investigate 16 currency pairs including seven major pairs and nine emerging 
pairs2. We have daily spot exchange rates from 1 January 2002 to 31 May 2014 from 
Bloomberg. Table 1 and 2 provide the descriptive statistics of daily and weekly 
returns where NZD/USD and TRY/USD have the highest and lowest mean return 
respectively. Regarding standard deviation, ZAR/USD is the highest and THB/USD is 
the lowest. Most pairs are negatively skew, all are leptokurtic and all are non-normal, 
which is confirmed by the Jarque-Bera statistic. Interest rates are also used to 
calculate the interest on overnight positions. Following Kho (1996) and Qi and Wu 
(2006), we employ the LIBOR rate (from Bloomberg) and for emerging currencies 
whose LIBORs are unavailable, we employ domestic bank rates from Datastream. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2  The currencies are US dollar (USD), Euro (EUR), Japanese yen (JPY), British pound (GBP), 
Australian dollar (AUD), Swiss franc (CHF), Canadian dollar (CAD), New Zealand dollar (NZD), 
Brazilian real (BRL), Czech koruna (CZK), Indian rupee (INR), Indonesian rupiah (IDR), Mexican 
peso (MXN), Polish zloty (PLN), South African rand (ZAR), Thai baht (THB) and Turkish lira (TRY). 
Table 2. The descriptive statistics of weekly FX returns where a superscript denotes significance at 
1%. Panel A and B include major and emerging currencies respectively. 
 
 
Mean (%) 
Standard 
deviation (%) 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Jarque-Bera 
normality 
Panel A: Major Currencies 
EUR/USD 0.065 1.381 -0.401 4.302 63 a 
JPY/USD 0.039 1.423 0.278 4.297 54 a 
GBP/USD 0.023 1.325 -0.710 7.034 493 a 
AUD/USD 0.090 1.898 -1.805 18.767 7053 a 
CHF/USD 0.095 1.508 -0.519 8.088 727 a 
CAD/USD 0.060 1.319 -0.791 7.794 687 a 
NZD/USD 0.105 1.936 -0.844 5.995 319 a 
Panel B: Emerging Currencies 
BRL/USD 0.006 2.211 -0.922 8.029 773 a 
CZK/USD 0.088 1.807 -0.358 4.000 41 a 
INR/USD -0.032 0.988 -0.326 6.055 263 a 
IDR/USD -0.018 1.197 -0.758 9.965 1370 a 
Table 1. The descriptive statistics of daily FX returns where a superscript denotes significance at 1%. 
Panel A and B include major and emerging currencies respectively. 
 
 
Mean (%) 
Standard 
deviation (%) 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Jarque-Bera 
normality 
Panel A: Major Currencies 
EUR/USD 0.013 0.622 0.016 4.526 314 a 
JPY/USD 0.008 0.646 -0.066 7.064 2231 a 
GBP/USD 0.004 0.573 -0.327 5.564 945 a 
AUD/USD 0.019 0.858 -0.419 13.418 14737 a 
CHF/USD 0.019 0.696 -0.539 14.558 18181 a 
CAD/USD 0.012 0.611 -0.162 5.774 1052 a 
NZD/USD 0.022 0.857 -0.397 6.014 1311 a 
Panel B: Emerging Currencies 
BRL/USD -0.001 1.090 -0.356 12.588 12470 a 
CZK/USD 0.018 0.827 -0.138 5.904 1148 a 
INR/USD -0.004 0.480 -0.019 9.397 5521 a 
IDR/USD -0.004 0.622 -0.639 22.364 50776 a 
MXN/USD -0.007 0.740 0.964 40.268 187770 a 
PLN/USD 0.008 0.949 -0.220 6.758 1931 a 
ZAR/USD 0.004 1.166 -1.024 15.311 21009 a 
THB/USD 0.009 0.449 -1.709 39.020 176622 a 
TRY/USD -0.011 0.917 -0.604 9.217 5409 a 
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3. Methodology 
3.1. Overreaction hypothesis 
We test the weekend overreaction in spot FX markets using the method of a closely 
related study by Rentzler et al. (2006), who investigate intraday reversals in currency 
futures after large opening gaps (i.e. the non-trading period from the close of the 
previous trading day to the open of the current trading day). Because our focus is 
weekend overreaction, the initial extreme movements are represented by large upward 
and downward price changes between Friday close and subsequent Monday open 
(hereafter, weekend gaps). These gaps may be caused by new price-relevant 
information over the weekends. If there is new information over the weekends which 
has clear and strong implications on the exchange rates, a large gap should occur 
when markets open on Monday to reflect this information. McFarland et al. (1982) 
state that during the weekends, information flows more actively in FX than in other 
markets and that price changes on Monday reflect weekend events. Moreover, 
Rogalski (1984) finds that the well-known weekend effect in the literature indeed 
occurs in the non-trading period from Friday close to Monday open and may be due to 
information released during the weekends. 3 
Following Rentzler et al. (2006), we define large weekend gaps as the top and bottom 
5% quantile of weekend returns. More specifically, we sort the weekend returns from 
highest to lowest and select the highest 5% quantile as large upward gaps and the 
lowest 5% quantile as large downward gaps. We use a relative threshold (i.e. quantile) 
                                                 
3 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this discussion. 
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to define extreme returns instead of an absolute value because an absolute value may 
be considered extreme for one time series but may not be for another, so it is better to 
let the time series itself decide how extreme is extreme. To be more comprehensive, 
we also consider other thresholds in addition to 5%. There is a trade-off between the 
extremeness of the threshold and the number of observations (i.e. the number of 
‘extreme return’ observations decreases when the threshold becomes more extreme 
and vice versa). Because we need both a reasonable number of observations and 
sufficiently extreme returns to study overreaction, we consider 5%, 10% and 15% 
thresholds. Regarding the observation horizons after the gaps, we consider one-day, 
three-day and one-week horizons. The returns are calculated as follows. 
 
𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 = ln (
𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛 𝐹𝑋 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒 𝐹𝑋 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
)           (1) 
𝑜𝑛𝑒– 𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 = ln (
𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒 𝐹𝑋 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛 𝐹𝑋 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
)               (2) 
𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑒– 𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 = ln (
𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑊𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒 𝐹𝑋 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛 𝐹𝑋 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
)         (3) 
𝑜𝑛𝑒– 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 = ln (
𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒 𝐹𝑋 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛 𝐹𝑋 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
)              (4) 
 
The global FX market is open 24 hours a day; the trading week starts in Australia at 
10pm GMT on Sunday and ends in the US at 10pm GMT on Friday. In equation (1) – 
(4), the Monday open refers to the Monday open of Australia (i.e. at 10pm GMT on 
the previous day), the close rates refer to the close of the US (i.e. at 10pm GMT on 
the same day). It is worth noting that a trading day in the global FX market consists of 
several international sessions, among which trading activities can be different 4. To be 
more informative, we also examine two intraday periods which both start at the 
Australian open and end at the European open (i.e. at 8am GMT on the same day) and 
US open (i.e. at 1pm GMT on the same day) respectively. The mean returns of 
weekend gaps and subsequent horizons are calculated separately for two cases, 
namely upward and downward gaps. If overreaction exists, the mean returns of the 
horizons after a large upward (downward) gap should be negative (positive). 
  
                                                 
4 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. 
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3.2. Trading strategy 
We develop a reversal trading strategy and summarise it in Table 3. We test this 
strategy out-of-sample to examine its performance in real time. The out-of-sample test 
starts in January 2007, which means in the first week of 2007, a trade will be initiated 
if the weekend gap exceeds the ‘large gap’ threshold estimated by the top and bottom 
quantiles of weekend returns during 2002 – 2006 period. The window for estimation 
is from January 2002 to December 2006 which is five years’ worth of weekly 
observations (because there is one weekend return every week). Including the 
financial crisis in the out-of-sample period helps us test the robustness of the trading 
strategy. The test moves forward week by week until May 2014, using both recursive 
and rolling estimation of large gaps.  
 
Table 3. Summary of the reversal trading strategy. This table describes different aspects of our reversal 
trading strategy.  
 
 
Trading style Contrarian 
Trading idea Based on overreaction 
Trade entry signal large weekend gaps (i.e. top and bottom quantiles of gap returns) 
Trade entry time Monday open 
Trade direction Opposite to the direction of the weekend gaps 
Holding period 
Because this strategy is based on overreaction, we choose the horizon 
which shows the most significant results in our prior tests for 
overreaction as the holding period. 
Trade exit signal End of holding period 
 
 
To discuss market efficiency, we follow Jensen (1978), who states that although the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis has been presented in different ways, its most general 
interpretation is that if the market is efficient with respect to a given information set, 
economic profits (defined as risk-adjusted returns after deducting costs) cannot be 
made by using this information set. Because the relevant information set for weak-
form efficiency is past data, the market is weak-form efficient if abnormal risk-
adjusted returns (net of costs) cannot be made by using past prices. To obtain 
abnormal risk-adjusted returns, we regress returns of the trading strategy against the 
currency risk factors used by Lustig et al. (2011), namely the average return of 
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currency market and the return of carry trade (i.e. buying high-interest currencies and 
selling low-interest currencies). If the market is weak-form efficient, active trading 
based on price patterns cannot generate statistically significant positive abnormal 
returns. Regarding strategy evaluation, let us consider the return of a long and short 
position in foreign currency from the perspective of US investors.  
 
Figure 1. Long and short positions in foreign currency. This figure illustrates the process of opening 
and closing long and short positions in a foreign currency. The domestic currency is USD. 
 
A. Long Positions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The respective returns of a long and short position are as follows. 
𝑅𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔,𝑡 = ln(𝑠𝑡 /𝑠𝑡−1) + 𝑟𝑏,𝑡 − 𝐶                                        (5) 
𝑅𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡,𝑡 = −ln(𝑠𝑡 /𝑠𝑡−1) −  𝑟𝑏,𝑡 + 2 𝑟𝑞,𝑡 − 𝐶                             (6) 
Equation (5) and (6) can be transformed into 
𝑅𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔,𝑡 = [ln(𝑠𝑡 /𝑠𝑡−1) +  𝑟𝑏,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑞,𝑡] + 𝑟𝑞,𝑡 − 𝐶                          (7) 
𝑅𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡,𝑡 = −[ln(𝑠𝑡 /𝑠𝑡−1) +  𝑟𝑏,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑞,𝑡] + 𝑟𝑞,𝑡 − 𝐶                        (8) 
Returns of long and short positions can be combined as 
𝑅𝑡 = [ln(𝑠𝑡 /𝑠𝑡−1) +  𝑟𝑏,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑞,𝑡]. 𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝑟𝑞,𝑡 − 𝐶                       (9) 
S is a signal function which transforms trade triggers into positions (White 2000) by 
taking the value of 1 or -1 for long or short positions respectively. t-1 and t denote the 
time of opening and closing positions, R is the return, s is the spot FX rate, 𝑟𝑏,𝑡 and 
Exchange domestic 
currency for foreign 
currency (open 
positions) 
Lend foreign 
currency during 
the trading 
horizon 
Exchange foreign 
currency for 
domestic currency 
(close positions) 
Borrow 
foreign 
currency 
Exchange 
foreign currency 
for domestic 
currency (open 
positions) 
Lend 
domestic 
currency 
(initial + 
borrowed) 
Exchange domestic 
currency to return 
the borrowed 
foreign currency 
(close positions) 
B.   Short Positions 
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𝑟𝑞,𝑡 are respective interest rates of the base and quote currency from t-1 to t. In our 
data, the exchange rates are quoted as the price of the foreign currency in USD (i.e. 
the domestic currency), in other words, how many US dollars are equal to one unit of 
foreign currency. Therefore, the foreign currency is the base currency and the 
domestic currency is the quote currency. C is the round-trip transaction cost which we 
set to 0.08% for major pairs in line with Bessembinder (1994) and 0.3% for emerging 
pairs as suggested by Kuang et al. (2014). Because 𝑟𝑞,𝑡 is the return from lending the 
quote currency (USD, which investors start with) during the trading horizon, it can be 
considered the risk-free rate. Therefore, the excess return of each trade is obtained by 
deducting 𝑟𝑞,𝑡 from equation (9). 
𝐸𝑅𝑡 = [ln(𝑠𝑡 /𝑠𝑡−1) +  𝑟𝑏,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑞,𝑡]. 𝑆𝑡−1 − 𝐶                           (10) 
ER is excess return. Also, when there is no trading signal, investors earn the risk-free 
rate 𝑟𝑞,𝑡 so the excess return is zero. Finally, to discuss market efficiency, we regress 
the excess return against two risk factors used in Lustig et al. (2011). The first factor 
is the average currency return (denoted as RX), which is the return of a portfolio 
including all 16 currencies in our sample. The second factor is the carry trade return 
(denoted as HML), which is the return difference between a portfolio including the 8 
highest-interest currencies and a portfolio including the 8 lowest-interest currencies. 
The regression is as follows.  
𝐸𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑅𝑋 𝑅𝑋𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡                             (11) 
𝜀𝑡 is the error term. If the currency market is efficient, the abnormal return α should 
not be positive with statistical significance. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Overreaction hypothesis 
Table 4 – 6 below report the results of the overreaction test using the top and bottom 
5%, 10% and 15% quantiles of weekend returns as large gaps. 
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Table 4. The mean returns (%) of large weekend gaps and subsequent horizons in the overreaction test using the top and bottom 5% quantile as large gaps where a, b and c 
superscripts denote significance (i.e. difference from zero) at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The third row shows the end of the horizons including the European open 
(EU open) and US open for intraday horizons and the US close for daily horizons. All horizons start after the large weekend gap at the Australian open (AU open) on 
Monday. Panel A and B include major and emerging currencies respectively. 
 
 Upward gaps Downward gaps 
 Large gap  One-day  Three-day One-week Large gap  One-day  Three-day One-week 
 AU open EU open US open US close US close US close AU open EU open US open US close US close US close 
Panel A: Major Currencies            
EUR/USD 0.374 -0.003   -0.281 a -0.238 b -0.727 a -0.451 c -0.409 0.006   -0.035   0.135 0.209   0.236 
JPY/USD 0.537 -0.043   0.110   -0.299 b -0.163   0.135 -0.444 0.148 b 0.183 b 0.322 a 0.634 a 0.124 
GBP/USD 0.330 -0.104   -0.117   -0.224 -0.214   -0.605 -0.319 0.013   -0.052   0.262 0.192   0.461 
AUD/USD 0.570 0.101   0.209   0.146 -0.079   0.104 -0.434 0.008   0.016   0.179 -0.264   0.579 
CHF/USD 0.501 -0.217 b -0.229 c -0.267 c -0.209   0.022 -0.403 0.009   -0.010   0.284 b -0.142   0.401 c 
CAD/USD 0.333 0.013   0.163   -0.093 0.200   -0.330 -0.267 0.085   0.126   0.194 0.339   0.289 
NZD/USD 0.461 -0.025   0.017   -0.037 -0.095   -1.160 b -0.575 0.056 0.155 0.298 c 0.209   0.930 c 
Panel mean 0.444 -0.040 -0.018 -0.131 c  -0.184 -0.326 -0.407 0.047 c 0.055 0.239 a 0.168 0.431 a 
Panel B: Emerging Currencies           
BRL/USD 0.855 -0.033   -0.025 c -0.073 -0.860 b -1.070 c -0.984 0.065   0.143   0.155 0.583   -0.156 
CZK/USD 0.646 -0.153   -0.152   -0.426 a -0.090   -0.851 c -0.622 0.023   0.039   0.336 c 0.126   0.203 
INR/USD 0.767 -0.236 a -0.237 a -0.383 a 0.045   -0.252 -0.641 -0.039   -0.004   0.244 c 0.190   -0.191 
IDR/USD 0.912 -0.114   -0.068   -0.640 a -0.158   -0.694 c -0.999 0.112 c 0.143 c 0.454 b 0.074   0.880 a 
MXN/USD 0.424 -0.009   0.050   -0.164 -0.008   -1.068 a -0.604 0.152 b -0.010   0.292 0.083   0.584 
PLN/USD 0.722 -0.004   -0.370 c -0.572 a -0.286   -1.154 c -0.678 -0.152   -0.003   0.104 0.195   0.206 
ZAR/USD 0.817 -0.288   -0.308 c -0.567 b -0.727   -1.209 b -0.836 0.118   -0.007   0.519 c -0.015   0.839 
THB/USD 0.583 -0.674 c -0.343   -0.393 a -0.085   -0.103 -0.808 -0.219   0.042   0.356 b 0.094   0.258 
TRY/USD 0.738 -0.268 a 0.031   0.223 -0.479   0.107 -0.751 0.048   0.079   0.283 -0.301   0.361 
Panel mean 0.718 -0.198 b -0.158 b -0.436 a -0.294 b -0.774 a -0.769 0.012 0.047 c 0.305 a 0.114 0.332 b 
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Table 5. The mean returns (%) of large weekend gaps and subsequent horizons in the overreaction test using the top and bottom 10% quantile as large gaps where a, b 
and c superscripts denote significance (i.e. difference from zero) at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The third row shows the end of the horizons including the 
European open (EU open) and US open for intraday horizons and the US close for daily horizons. All horizons start after the large weekend gap at the Australian open 
(AU open) on Monday. Panel A and B include major and emerging currencies respectively. 
 
 Upward gaps Downward gaps 
 Large gap  One-day  Three-day One-week Large gap  One-day  Three-day One-week 
 AU open EU open US open US close US close US close AU open EU open US open US close US close US close 
Panel A: Major Currencies            
EUR/USD 0.299 -0.001   -0.157 b -0.313 a -0.580 a -0.436 b -0.368 -0.007   -0.071   -0.001   0.107   0.266   
JPY/USD 0.446 -0.066   -0.007   -0.061   -0.168   -0.116   -0.359 0.104 b 0.116 b 0.183 b 0.334 b 0.303   
GBP/USD 0.287 -0.094 b -0.081   -0.044   -0.099   -0.115   -0.301 0.036   -0.080   0.061   0.200   0.128   
AUD/USD 0.486 0.007   -0.007   0.002   -0.046   0.019   -0.361 0.034   0.051   0.129   -0.037   0.056   
CHF/USD 0.417 -0.155 a -0.154 b -0.236 a -0.072   -0.112   -0.333 0.032   0.063   0.079   -0.008   -0.014   
CAD/USD 0.224  0.020  0.075   0.155 c 0.082   0.128   -0.157 0.057   0.073   0.046   0.217   0.053   
NZD/USD 0.424 -0.070   -0.091   -0.140   -0.256   -0.167   -0.468 0.018 -0.053 0.044 0.227 0.360 
Panel mean 0.369 -0.051 c -0.060 -0.091 -0.163 c -0.114 -0.335 0.039 b 0.014 0.077 b 0.149 b 0.164 b 
Panel B: Emerging Currencies           
BRL/USD 0.642 -0.041   -0.018 c -0.051   -0.565 a -0.745 a -0.455 0.053   0.112 c 0.076   0.100   -0.133   
CZK/USD 0.407 -0.076   -0.076   -0.101   -0.055   -0.176   -0.391 0.004   0.034   0.055   0.244   0.352   
INR/USD 0.603 -0.228 a -0.267 a -0.162 a -0.249   -0.126   -0.272 -0.020   -0.007   0.123 b 0.126   0.183 c 
IDR/USD 0.580 -0.122 b -0.135 b -0.210 a -0.306 a -0.286 a -0.653 0.051 c 0.087 b 0.150 a 0.070   -0.142   
MXN/USD 0.313 -0.004   0.034   0.016   0.088   0.188   -0.456 0.065 c -0.021   -0.125 c -0.090   -0.286   
PLN/USD 0.516 0.054   -0.231 b -0.243 c -0.159   -0.265   -0.494 -0.072   0.029   -0.068   0.129   0.203   
ZAR/USD 0.505 -0.171 c -0.203 c -0.216   -0.485   -0.446   -0.576 0.042   -0.118   0.003   -0.119   0.279   
THB/USD 0.189 -0.349 c -0.193 c -0.090 c -0.012   0.022   -0.453 -0.295   0.010   0.069   0.064   0.115   
TRY/USD 0.310 -0.161 a -0.061   -0.134   -0.325   -0.339   -0.366 0.062   0.101   0.048   -0.115   -0.138   
Panel mean 0.452 -0.122 b -0.128 a -0.132 a -0.230 b -0.241 b -0.457 -0.012 0.025 0.037 0.045 0.048 
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Table 6. The mean returns (%) of large weekend gaps and subsequent horizons in the overreaction test using the top and bottom 15% quantile as large gaps where a, b and c 
superscripts denote significance (i.e. difference from zero) at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The third row shows the end of the horizons including the European 
open (EU open) and US open for intraday horizons and the US close for daily horizons. All horizons start after the large weekend gap at the Australian open (AU open) on 
Monday. Panel A and B include major and emerging currencies respectively. 
 
 Upward gaps Downward gaps 
 Large gap  One-day  Three-day One-week Large gap  One-day  Three-day One-week 
 AU open EU open US open US close US close US close AU open EU open US open US close US close US close 
Panel A: Major Currencies            
EUR/USD 0.216 -0.012   -0.101 c -0.165 b -0.337 a -0.257 c -0.292 0.036   0.007   0.093   0.249   0.374   
JPY/USD 0.366 -0.034   -0.007   -0.030   -0.079   -0.024   -0.282 0.075 b 0.090 b 0.128 b 0.271 b 0.291 c 
GBP/USD 0.237 -0.074 b -0.072   -0.062   0.024   0.058   -0.238 0.060 b 0.011   0.105   0.207 c 0.165   
AUD/USD 0.369 -0.005   0.022   0.036   -0.021   0.067   -0.273 0.043   0.045   0.107   -0.127   -0.047   
CHF/USD 0.337 -0.086 c -0.090   -0.195 a  -0.113  -0.035   -0.264 0.014   0.041   0.072   -0.042   0.080   
CAD/USD 0.165 -0.019   0.023   0.084   -0.024   0.059   -0.111 0.053 c 0.014   0.009   0.081   0.033   
NZD/USD 0.327 -0.058   -0.042   -0.066   -0.272 c -0.097   -0.392 -0.019 0.031 0.087 0.355 0.440 
Panel mean 0.288 -0.041 b -0.038 c -0.057 -0.117 c -0.033 -0.264 0.037 b 0.034 b 0.086 a 0.142 c 0.191 b 
Panel B: Emerging Currencies           
BRL/USD 0.380 -0.001   -0.011   -0.047 b -0.301 b -0.345   -0.217 0.044 c 0.071 c 0.018   -0.042   -0.113   
CZK/USD 0.196 -0.058   -0.050   -0.050   -0.013   0.003   -0.131 0.003   0.023   0.027   0.112   0.218   
INR/USD 0.477 -0.161 a -0.204 a -0.099   -0.145   -0.021   -0.141 -0.017   -0.050   0.071   0.063   0.159 c 
IDR/USD 0.454 -0.090 b -0.104 b -0.143 a -0.217 a -0.167 b -0.435 0.005   0.029   0.071 b 0.096   -0.170 b 
MXN/USD 0.153 -0.009   0.015   0.002   -0.061   0.026   -0.272 0.040 c 0.010   -0.028   0.023   -0.169   
PLN/USD 0.418 0.004   -0.217 b -0.278 a -0.255   -0.317   -0.400 -0.044   0.052   -0.024   0.105   0.301   
ZAR/USD 0.417 -0.174 b -0.136   -0.210   -0.262   -0.267   -0.407 0.038   -0.009   0.107   0.102   0.448   
THB/USD 0.138 -0.237 c -0.134 c -0.053   0.017   0.069   -0.120 -0.207   -0.009   0.032   -0.012   0.055   
TRY/USD 0.224 -0.119 a -0.055   -0.100   -0.235 c -0.251   -0.259 0.027   0.023   -0.141   -0.209   -0.317   
Panel mean 0.318 -0.094 b -0.099 a -0.109 a -0.163 a -0.141 b -0.265 -0.012 0.016 0.015 0.026 0.046 
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For ease of interpretation, we summarise Table 4 – 6 in Table 7 and 8 below. Table 7 
summarises the directional behaviours of mean returns of subsequent horizons after 
the large gaps, showing the number of negative returns, statistically significant 
negative returns, positive returns and statistically significant positive returns for major 
currencies as a whole and emerging currencies as a whole. Table 8 reports only the 
group average returns of major and emerging currencies (i.e. ‘panel mean’ in Table 4 
– 6). 
 
Table 7. Directional behaviours of mean returns of subsequent horizons. This table shows the number 
of negative returns, statistically significant negative returns, positive returns and statistically significant 
positive returns for major currencies as a whole and emerging currencies as a whole. The total number 
of returns is 35 for major currencies (7 pairs times 5 horizons) and 45 for emerging currencies (9 pairs 
times 5 horizons). 
 
  Upward gaps   Downward gaps  
 Negative Positive Positive Negative 
 Total Significant Total Significant Total Significant Total Significant 
Panel A: Major Currencies       
5% quantile 24 9 11 0 30 8 5 0 
10% quantile 27 8 8 1 27 4 8 0 
15% quantile 27 16 8 0 31 8 4 0 
Panel B: Emerging Currencies       
5% quantile 40 20 5 0 34 9 11 0 
10% quantile 39 19 6 0 30 7 15 1 
15% quantile 38 16 7 0 29 5 16 1 
 
 
 
Table 8. Group average returns (%) of large weekend gaps and subsequent horizons in the overreaction 
test using the top and bottom quantiles as large gaps where a, b and c superscripts denote significance 
(i.e. difference from zero) at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The second row shows the end of 
the horizons including the European open (EU open) and US open for intraday horizons and the US 
close for daily horizons. All horizons start after the large weekend gap at the Australian open (AU 
open) on Monday. Top and bottom quantiles refer to upward and downward gaps respectively. 
 
 Large gap  One-day  Three-day One-week 
 AU open EU open US open US close US close US close 
Panel A: Major Currencies      
Top 5% quantile 0.444 -0.040 -0.018 -0.131 c -0.184 -0.326 
Top 10% quantile 0.369 -0.051 c -0.060 -0.091 -0.163 c -0.114 
Top 15% quantile 0.288 -0.041 b -0.038 c -0.057 -0.117 c -0.033 
Bottom 5% quantile -0.407 0.047 c 0.055 0.239 a 0.168 0.431 a 
Bottom 10% quantile -0.335 0.039 b 0.014 0.077 b 0.149 b 0.164 b 
Bottom 15% quantile -0.264 0.037 b 0.034 b 0.086 a 0.142 c 0.191 b 
Panel B: Emerging Currencies      
Top 5% quantile 0.718 -0.198 b -0.158 b -0.436 a -0.294 b -0.774 a 
Top 10% quantile 0.452 -0.122 b -0.128 a -0.132 a -0.230 b -0.241 b 
Top 15% quantile 0.318 -0.094 b -0.099 a -0.109 a -0.163 a -0.141 b 
Bottom 5% quantile -0.769 0.012 0.047 c 0.305 a 0.114 0.332 b 
Bottom 10% quantile -0.457 -0.012 0.025 0.037 0.045 0.048 
Bottom 15% quantile -0.265 -0.012 0.016 0.015 0.026 0.046 
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As shown in Table 7, the majority of mean returns of subsequent horizons after a 
positive (negative) gap are negative (positive) and there is almost no significant 
momentum (i.e. positive returns after upward gaps and negative returns after 
downward gaps). Therefore, our results show strong evidence of large weekend gaps 
due to overreaction in these currency markets. The proportion of significant reversals 
(i.e. negative returns after upward gaps and positive returns after downward gaps) is 
higher for upward gaps than for downward gaps, and often lower for major currencies 
than for emerging currencies. The results are most pronounced for the 5% quantile, 
evidenced by the highest proportion of significant reversals and zero significant 
momentum. On the other hand, Table 8 shows that after large weekend gaps, the 
currency pairs often reverse gradually throughout the week and their reversals are 
often largest at the end of the week. In general, major currencies show smaller gaps 
and reversals than emerging currencies, the 5% quantiles show the largest reversals 
and the top quantiles show larger reversals than the bottom quantiles.  
 
4.2. Trading strategy 
Because the previous analysis shows that overreaction and reversals are most 
significant for the 5% quantiles in the one-week horizon, we examine our reversal 
trading strategy based on overreaction using the top and bottom 5% quantiles of 
weekend returns as the entry signal and the one-week horizon as the trading horizon. 
We test the strategy out-of-sample starting in January 2007, which means in the first 
week of 2007, a trade will be initiated if the weekend gap exceeds the ‘large gap’ 
threshold estimated by the top and bottom 5% quantile of gap returns during 2002 – 
2006 period. Including the financial crisis in the out-of-sample period helps us test the 
robustness of the trading strategy. The test moves forward week by week until May 
2014, using both recursive and rolling estimation of large gaps. To adjust the trading 
returns for risks, we regress them against the currency risk factors used by Lustig et 
al. (2011). We report the regression results in Table 9 as well as other aspects of the 
strategy including the drawdown (Table 10) and the distribution of profitable signals 
over time (Figure 2).  
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Table 9. Results of regression (11). The dependent variable is returns of the trading strategy using both recursive and 
rolling approach. The independent variables are currency risk factors including the average currency return (RX) and the 
carry trade return (HML). The intercept α is the abnormal return (%). The standard errors are provided in brackets. a, b and c 
superscripts denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Panel A and B include major and 
emerging currencies respectively. The ‘Group’ row is obtained by trading a portfolio including all currencies in the panel. 
 Recursive Rolling 
 𝛼 𝛽𝑅𝑋 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿 Adjusted R
2 𝛼 𝛽𝑅𝑋 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿 Adjusted R
2 
Panel A: Major Currencies 
EUR/USD 0.04 0.0640 a 0.0348 0.0315 0.04 0.0714 a 0.0291 0.0312 
 (0.03) (0.0246) (0.0281)  (0.03) (0.0258) (0.0294)  
JPY/USD 0.00 0.0515 b -0.0451 c 0.0093 0.00 0.0389 c -0.0497 c 0.0068 
 (0.02) (0.0229) (0.0262)  (0.02) (0.0224) (0.0256)  
GBP/USD 0.07 c -0.1279 a 0.0525 0.0192 0.08 c -0.1187 a 0.0524 0.0158 
 (0.04) (0.0417) (0.0476)  (0.04) (0.0417) (0.0476)  
AUD/USD 0.01 -0.0418 0.1717 b 0.0102 0.02 -0.0013 0.1877 a 0.0179 
 (0.07) (0.0630) (0.0719)  (0.07) (0.0618) (0.0705)  
CHF/USD 0.05 b 0.0129 -0.0125 -0.0043 0.05 c 0.0113 -0.0077 -0.0046 
 (0.03) (0.0237) (0.0270)  (0.03) (0.0240) (0.0274)  
CAD/USD 0.00 -0.0375 0.0397 0.0013 0.01 -0.0069 0.0320 -0.0014 
 (0.03) (0.0267) (0.0305)  (0.03) (0.0240) (0.0274)  
NZD/USD 0.19 a -0.1053 b -0.0579 0.0225 0.20 a -0.1037 b -0.0709 0.0243 
 (0.05) (0.0469) (0.0536)  (0.05) (0.0478) (0.0546)  
Group 0.05 b -0.0263 0.0262 0.0001 0.06 a -0.0156 0.0247 -0.0020 
 (0.02) (0.0202) (0.0230)  (0.02) (0.0202) (0.0231)  
Panel B: Emerging Currencies 
BRL/USD 0.04 -0.0558 0.0089 -0.0023 0.06 -0.0513 0.0136 -0.0028 
 (0.06) (0.0561) (0.0641)  (0.06) (0.0552) (0.0630)  
CZK/USD 0.00 0.0252 0.0680 0.0062 0.01 0.0063 0.0289 -0.0035 
 (0.04) (0.0405) (0.0462)  (0.04) (0.0400) (0.0456)  
INR/USD -0.05 c -0.0212 0.0872 a 0.0181 -0.04 -0.0284 0.0952 a 0.0229 
 (0.03) (0.0259) (0.0295)  (0.03) (0.0254) (0.0290)  
IDR/USD 0.06 c 0.0020 0.0295 -0.0027 0.06 c -0.0206 0.0652 b 0.0059 
 (0.03) (0.0308) (0.0351)  (0.03) (0.0278) (0.0317)  
MXN/USD 0.11 a -0.1544 a 0.1098 b 0.0384 0.09 b -0.1603 a 0.0999 b 0.0445 
 (0.04) (0.0375) (0.0429)  (0.04) (0.0360) (0.0411)  
PLN/USD 0.05 -0.0526 0.2225 a 0.0206 0.02 -0.0521 0.2285 a 0.0279 
 (0.07) (0.0629) (0.0718)  (0.06) (0.0569) (0.0649)  
ZAR/USD 0.09 -0.0396 0.1735 a 0.0182 0.09 -0.0274 0.1825 a 0.0234 
 (0.06) (0.0516) (0.0589)  (0.05) (0.0504) (0.0575)  
THB/USD -0.01 0.0389 -0.0139 -0.0002 -0.01 0.0285 -0.0069 -0.0023 
 (0.03) (0.0285) (0.0326)  (0.03) (0.0284) (0.0324)  
TRY/USD -0.04 0.0982 b 0.1933 a 0.0867 -0.02 0.1080 b 0.2108 a 0.0907 
 (0.05) (0.0424) (0.0484)  (0.05) (0.0452) (0.0516)  
Group 0.03 -0.0177 0.0977 a 0.0501 0.03 -0.0219 0.1020 a 0.0565 
 (0.02) (0.0189) (0.0215)  (0.02) (0.0184) (0.0210)  
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Table 10. Maximum drawdown (%) of the reversal strategy. Panel A and B include major and 
emerging currencies respectively. 
 
 
 Recursive Rolling 
Panel A: Major Currencies  
EUR/USD 5.957 5.957 
JPY/USD 14.585 13.246 
GBP/USD 9.825 9.825 
AUD/USD 24.067 24.067 
CHF/USD 2.692 2.315 
CAD/USD 8.883 6.522 
NZD/USD 3.996 3.996 
Panel mean 10.001 9.418 
Panel B: Emerging Currencies  
BRL/USD 19.170 19.170 
CZK/USD 18.390 15.992 
INR/USD 23.416 20.806 
IDR/USD 7.171 7.171 
MXN/USD 5.972 5.235 
PLN/USD 21.610 20.568 
ZAR/USD 11.584 11.584 
THB/USD 11.348 11.348 
TRY/USD 16.774 12.943 
Panel mean 15.048 13.869 
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Figure 2. Distribution of profitable trades over time. This figure shows the distribution of profitable trades generated by the reversal strategy over time using recursive and 
rolling estimation of ‘large gap’ signals. The vertical axis shows the return of each trade (%). 
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Table 9 above shows that the regression results are similar for both the recursive and 
rolling approach of the trading strategy. Although statistically significant in some 
cases, the currency risk factors have limited explanatory power for variations in 
trading returns as shown by the low R2 values, which means that the trading strategy 
is not sensitive to systematic risks. The abnormal return α is statistically significant 
for both major and emerging currencies as well as for both individual currencies and 
portfolio. Because the trading horizon is one week, the abnormal return in Table 9 is a 
weekly average. NZD/USD generates the most significant abnormal return, which is 
0.2% per week and thus 10.4% per annum. Regarding the drawdown of the trading 
strategy (Table 10), it ranges from 2.3% to 24.1% and is often lower for major 
currencies than for emerging currencies while higher for the recursive approach than 
for the rolling approach. As shown in Figure 2, profitable trades are distributed 
similarly for both the recursive and rolling approach. These trades occur regularly 
throughout the trading period with two clusters of highly profitable trades during 2008 
– 2009 and 2011 – 2012, and the strategy performs well in the financial crisis. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We find a calendar effect, namely the weekend overreaction, in spot FX rates of 7 
major and 9 emerging currency pairs, evidenced by reversals in multiple horizons 
during the week after large weekend gaps. A contrarian strategy is designed to exploit 
this effect. In the out-of-sample trading test, the strategy is able to generate abnormal 
risk-adjusted returns after including transaction costs and interest rates, which 
suggests the possibility of weak-form inefficiency in these currency markets.  
 
19 
 
References 
 
Alonso, A. and Rubio, G. (1990) 'Overreaction in the Spanish Equity Market', Journal 
of Banking & Finance, 14(2-3), 469-481. 
 
Amini, S., Gebka, B., Hudson, R. and Keasey, K. (2013) 'A review of the 
international literature on the short term predictability of stock prices 
conditional on large prior price changes: Microstructure, behavioral and risk 
related explanations', International Review of Financial Analysis, 26, 1-17. 
 
Antoniou, A., Galariotis, E. C. and Spyrou, S. I. (2005) 'Contrarian profits and the 
overreaction hypothesis: the case of the Athens Stock Exchange', European 
Financial Management, 11(1), 71-98. 
 
Atkins, A. B. and Dyl, E. A. (1990) 'Price Reversals, Bid-Ask Spreads, and Market-
Efficiency', Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 25(4), 535-547. 
 
Barberis, N., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1998) 'A model of investor sentiment', 
Journal of Financial Economics, 49, 307-344. 
 
Bauman, W. S., Conover, C. M. and Miller, R. E. (1999) 'Investor overreaction in 
international stock markets - Value stocks outperform outside the U.S.', 
Journal of Portfolio Management, 25(4), 102-111. 
 
Bessembinder, H. (1994) 'Bid-Ask Spreads in the Interbank Foreign-Exchange 
Markets', Journal of Financial Economics, 35(3), 317-348. 
 
Cox, D. R. and Peterson, D. R. (1994) 'Stock Returns Following Large One-Day 
Declines - Evidence on Short-Term Reversals and Longer-Term Performance', 
Journal of Finance, 49(1), 255-267. 
 
Daniel, K., Hirshleifer, D. and Subrahmanyam, A. (2001) 'Overconfidence, arbitrage 
and equilibrium asset pricing', Journal of Finance, 56, 921-965. 
 
Debondt, W. F. M. and Thaler, R. (1985) 'Does the Stock-Market Overreact', Journal 
of Finance, 40(3), 793-805. 
 
Debondt, W. F. M. and Thaler, R. H. (1987) 'Further Evidence on Investor 
Overreaction and Stock-Market Seasonality', Journal of Finance, 42(3), 557-
581. 
 
Ederington, L. H. and Lee, J. H. (1995) 'The Short-Run Dynamics of the Price 
Adjustment to New Information', Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, 30(1), 117-134. 
 
French, K. R. and Roll, R. (1986) 'Stock Return Variances - the Arrival of 
Information and the Reaction of Traders', Journal of Financial Economics, 
17(1), 5-26. 
 
20 
 
Fung, A. K. W., Mok, D. M. Y. and Lam, K. (2000) 'Intraday price reversals for index 
futures in the US and Hong Kong', Journal of Banking & Finance, 24(7), 
1179-1201. 
 
Goodhart, C. (1988) 'The Foreign-Exchange Market - a Random-Walk with a 
Dragging Anchor', Economica, 55(220), 437-460. 
 
Ito, T., Lyons, R. K. and Melvin, M. T. (1998) 'Is there private information in the FX 
market? The Tokyo experiment', Journal of Finance, 53(3), 1111-1130. 
 
Jegadeesh, N. and Titman, S. (1995) 'Overreaction, delayed reaction, and contrarian 
profits', Review of Financial Studies, 8(4), 973-993. 
 
Jensen, M. C. (1978) 'Some anomalous evidence regarding market efficiency', 
Journal of Financial Economics, 6, 95-101. 
 
Kho, B. C. (1996) 'Time-varying risk premia, volatility, and technical trading rule 
profits: Evidence from foreign currency futures markets', Journal of Financial 
Economics, 41(2), 249-290. 
 
Kuang, P., Schroder, M. and Wang, Q. (2014) 'Illusory profitability of technical 
analysis in emerging foreign exchange markets', International Journal of 
Forecasting, 30(2), 192-205. 
 
Larson, S. J. and Madura, J. (2001) 'Overreaction and underreaction in the foreign 
exchange market', Global Finance Journal, 12, 153-177. 
 
Lustig, H., Roussanov, N. and Verdelhan, A. (2011) 'Common Risk Factors in 
Currency Markets', Review of Financial Studies, 24(11), 3731-3777. 
 
McFarland, J. W., Richardson Pettit, R. and Sung, S. K. (1982) 'The distribution of 
foreign exchange price changes: trading day effects and risk measurement', 
Journal of Finance, 37(3), 693-715. 
 
Menkhoff, L., Sarno, L., Schmeling, M. and Schrimpf, A. (2012) 'Currency 
momentum strategies', Journal of Financial Economics, 106, 660-684. 
 
Parikakis, G. S. and Syriopoulos, T. (2008) 'Contrarian strategy and overreaction in 
foreign exchange markets', Research in International Business and Finance, 
22, 319-324. 
 
Qi, M. and Wu, Y. R. (2006) 'Technical trading-rule profitability, data snooping, and 
reality check: Evidence from the foreign exchange market', Journal of Money 
Credit and Banking, 38(8), 2135-2158. 
 
Rentzler, J., Tandon, K. and Yu, S. (2006) 'Intraday price-reversal patterns in the 
currency futures market The impact of the introduction of GLOBEX and the 
euro, Journal of Futures Markets Volume 26, Issue 11', Journal of Futures 
Markets, 26(11), 1089-1130. 
 
21 
 
Rogalski, R. J. (1984) 'New Findings Regarding Day-of-the-Week Returns over 
Trading and Non-Trading Periods', Journal of Finance, 39(5), 1603-1614. 
 
Urquhart, A. and McGroarty, F. (2014) 'Calendar effects, market conditions and the 
Adaptive Market Hypothesis: Evidence from long-run U.S. data', International 
Review of Financial Analysis, 35, 154-166. 
 
White, H. (2000) 'A reality check for data snooping', Econometrica, 68(5), 1097-
1126. 
 
Zarowin, P. (1990) 'Size, Seasonality, and Stock-Market Overreaction', Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 25(1), 113-125. 
 
 
